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1REFUGEES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The Context for the Refugee Working Group
These are multilateral talks intended to supplement the bilateral
talks and clearly not replace them or act as a forum for putting
pressure on the bilateral discussants. They are intended to provide: a)
an appropriate atmosphere; b) small practical steps upon which a
foundation can be built; and c) utilization of expertise, experience,
knowledge and resources of others. The Canadian government has assumed
responsibility for initiating a sustainable process which will induce
the parties concerned to work together on the problems of the displaced
within the countries involved in the bilateral process or originating
from that area.
A. Canada's Role?
What is a nice country like Canada doing mixing itself up in the
mess of the Middle East? Why did we agree to "gavel" the fifth working
group in the Middle East peace talks and what do we want to emerge from
those talks? The two questions are very different. A fifth stream to
the talks may have been initiated to get the Palestinians to
participate in Moscow and to deal with an issue that had no obvious
forum in the established four streams. We may have become involved
because we were asked to by the United States and/or because we are the
obvious country to chair a working group on refugees given our past
commitments and leading role in this area. We have both credibility and
expertise. But if that credibility and expertise are not to be
squandered, we had better make sure we have our act together. This
entails both knowing what is feasible and opportune, at the same time
as we are self-conscious of the role Canada can play given what Canada
is and, even more importantly, what Canada is perceived to be.
This means that the first imperative entails an examination of
Canada before we even look at the Middle East. This may seem odd.
Traditionally, international issues were seen as something out there,
something which existed quite independently of Canada's persona in the
world and certainly independently of Canada's domestic situation. The
fact, however, is that we have been asked to play the role we are
playing because of that persona, and if we are to play a role in any
way commensurate with the task in front of us, we must understand that
persona and what elements of it can be best "exploited" and which
elements must be revised to apply to the task now before us. Further,
Canada never viewed the Middle East as an strategic arena of superpower
conflict. Finally, the role we play and the results that may emerge may
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mean that foreign policy is determined by domestic considerations as is
often alleged to be the case in the United States. It does mean that
the domestic factors, particularly those which might influence the role
we play, must be recognized.
Canada has a different political culture which does not except
political lobbying by ethnic groups on external affairs issues as quite
legitimate. The Canada Israel Committee (CIC), B'nai Brith on its own
as well as a part of CIC, the Canadian Arab Federation and the Canada-
Palestine Committee are, in fact, ethnic lobbies in Canada. We have a
much more mandarin system in comparison to the United States; senior
bureaucrats regard foreign affairs as matters of objective rationality
even when dealing with subjective passions, and tend to regard ethnic
lobbies as parochial and sectarian. However, economic self interest is
not regarded as sectarian and special pleading, but in the self
interest of Canada as a whole, though Canada's very modest trade
figures with the Middle East, in spite of our best efforts and
considerable sacrifice, would indicate that economic self-interest
would have little role to play. Nevertheless, special economic
interests -engineering (Lavalin or its resurrected version), banking,
manufacturing particularly in telecommunications, construction (ATCO)
and aircraft (de Haviland) - and the new foreign policy priorities that
began with the Trudeau government, shifted the base of foreign policy
decisions towards the politicized private economic sphere.  
However, beyond the self image of external affairs mandarins as
objective and rational players with a predominant role, assuming that
domestic ethnic lobbies continue to play a marginal role, accepting
that economic self interest has increased its role in the determination
of foreign policy, the most important factor will likely be the way we
project our subjective angst on the Middle East cauldron. In a time of
unstable domestic politics, at a time when separatism of one national
group in Canada is at centre stage of our domestic political agenda, at
a time when indigenous populations who lived in this country long
before the arrival of the new settlers who came to dominate the
national life of Canada
are also front and centre, and at a time when commitments to the
resolution of an issue in the Middle East may entail possible further
future financial commitments of Canada at a time when the country is
fitfully (and hopefully) crawling out of a deep recession, then the
domestic situation in Canada cannot be ignored because it will
inevitably project itself onto the Middle East refugee situation and
Canada's role in and perception of it.
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fore when there are dramatically different perceptions of what is just
both in the domestic resolution of key issues and in the solution of
key conflicts in the Middle East. It will be just too easy for Middle
East issues to become stalking horses for domestic debates. Symbolism
can easily overwhelm reality. This is now widely accepted as the case
with participants in a conflict; it is less often recognized to affect
the role of the "brokers' to these conflicts.
All this is to say that domestic issues and perceptions critically
affect the way issues in the Middle East will be perceived and
interpreted.  So will the perceptions of Canada already extant in the
international community. There are three issues, and not just one, with
which Canada has been and is identified that make it appropriate that
Canada provide some degree of leadership in this area: peace-keeping,
refugees and human rights. All are relevant in this context. The
refugee expertise seems obvious, but our expertise will be most
appropriate to the refugees in the diaspora. Refugees in Gaza and the
West Bank who have not left their homeland, even if they left their
homes, will draw much more on other aspects of our knowledge and
experience.
Peace-keeping will likely be an issue because security measures
may be necessary to protect refugees living in the West Bank and Gaza.
We (or others) may be required to send Refugee Compliance Experts to
the Middle East. If they are to fulfil their role, then we may have to
insist that the terms and conditions for a Compliance Expert to
participate be set down clearly and adequately without being hamstrung
by political considerations. After all, we did not participate in
UNIFIL because we correctly recognized that the terms were unacceptable
and the situation was too politicized. Canada has been and must remain
unwilling to sacrifice its hard won expertise and reputation under any
international or regional pressure for a compromise which might
unnecessarily risk our own or other country's personnel.
Our peace keeping expertise has also been built up on a knowledge
of what is required for confidence building mechanisms between and
among antagonistic negotiating partners. The four key conditions
essential to such measures are certain to be applicable - transparency,
compliance, verification and the designation of appropriate and
effective measure that may be required in the face of non-compliance.
Though these requirements may emerge way down the line, they begin to
be established early in the game. Further, the work necessary to
establish certain factors essential for transparency, such as
4agreements on numbers, has to begin now. Questions about the role of
neutral third parties will have to be faced early, and in fact, that
role will be established, in part, by the way Canada "gavels" the
sessions. 
Human rights are also an issue. Anyone in the least familiar with
the intifada over the last three years, and the events in the occupied
territories prior to that, know that the human rights of the refugees
among others are critical during the process of discussions and during
any interim arrangements. Canada has had expertise in ensuring
transparency and in establishing compliance and verification mechanisms
for such situations before, as in Namibia.
 
In addition to being identified with issues of critical concern
to any discussion of refugees, that is, not only the refugees
themselves, but the security of those refugees and the protection of
their human rights as well, we have also played an international policy
role in the past which intertwine three other factors of relevance to
this issue. We are recognized as being relatively even-handed, we are
a middle power and we have played the role of honest broker. The latter
may now appear archaic, but it is very relevant to the role Canada has
been asked and been given an opportunity to play at this time.
The issues are relevant. Our past record and characteristic roles
are relevant. However, some of the past tactics we have employed are
not quite as relevant. In fact, some of them may be wrong. Again there
are three I would focus on. These have to be discussed in more detail
because a critical analysis is necessary.
The first is a propensity for Canada to demur from taking an
initiating role. We are not the United States. More importantly, we
define ourselves in part as not the United States. Canada has neither
the power nor the prestige to take open initiatives that suggest what
roles the various protagonists are to play. But this does not mean
Canada should simply be passive. Canada, if it is to provide
leadership, must play an active role and develop an overall strategy.
Otherwise the medium will become the message conveying passive
resignation rather than goal oriented action. I once wrote down a
principle of mediation - and do not forget that this is really the role
that Canada has agreed to undertake - that I believe came from Abba
Eban. "What gives a negotiator a chance of success is not so much his
skill or sincerity as his visible authority." Canada has an authentic
authority in all the key areas of relevance to these negotiations -
refugees, security issues and the defence of human rights. We must
match that authentic authority with the appropriate formal authority
5that we adopt as gaveller and provide significant leadership in these
talks.
The second important tactic I want to address is the use of
"creative ambiguity". Michael Shenstone and several others enunciated
this dictum as a critical byword for the process anticipated. I
couldn't disagree more. In fact, I would blame the "creative ambiguity"
used by Western diplomats for almost as much of the problem of
Palestinian refugees as Bernadotte's belief that he was a god and not
just a divine messenger who had the power to deliver repatriation for
the refugees against the reality of the conflict and all past
experience in dealing with refugees. For "economic integration" was the
creation of "creative ambiguity", a slogan which stood for permanent
resettlement of the refugees in countries of the Middle East without
saying that this was the function of the large scale economic schemes
behind the setting up of UNRWA. UNRWA was set up to solve the problem
of the refugees permanently, and not as its propagandists would have
it, to simply await the outcome of a separate peace process. But the
propaganda became the reality precisely because "creative ambiguity"
was used and the consequent efforts to develop practical solutions
leading to permanent settlement were failures. To use the words of
Henry Kissinger in his address to the Peace Conference on the Middle
East in Geneva on December 21, 1973, "We can make propaganda or we can
make progress." The latter calls for clear and unequivocal statements
and terms, and not ambiguity which is called in doublespeak creative
when it most often turns out to be destructive. The weapons of a
messenger of the gods or of God are words. The earthly situation
provides the opportunities. Semantic precision, not creative ambiguity,
must be the byword of the discussions while we keep in mind the
connotations of all terms when they emerge in the public.
We are all aware that words can cause war. Bismarck's editing of
the Ems telegram that led (intentionally on the part of Bismarck) to
the Franco-Prussian War may perhaps be the most famous example. The
quibble over words may also delay peace and cost countless lives
because there is inadequate precision given to the words used in
diplomacy. Here the use of "pourrait" in Hanoi's offer to negotiate
peace with the United States may serve as another example. "Pourrait"
was translated as 'could' in referring to possible talks between the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Americans, when it, in fact,
connoted a virtual certainty and not merely a possibility. The direct
consequence of the confusion was mutual misunderstanding and the
breakdown in the first Kissinger peace initiative (when he was still an
academic) and five more clearly unnecessary years of war and
destruction.
6As a second tactic we must employ semantic precision not 'creative
ambiguity' in all aspects of the discussions.
The third traditional tactic is to employ quiet diplomacy. This
means diplomacy free from the glare of publicity. It also seems to
imply that parties in negotiations can take positions in private which
depart significantly from their public pronouncements. But whatever the
truth of this dictum for the major parties in the conflict, the exact
opposite must be the case with the mediator.
A mediator is literally and historically an angel (from the Greek
'angelos' meaning messenger) from heaven. A mediator (Mal'ach in
Hebrew) is one sent by God to pronounce the way divine justice will be
brought to earth. As the Jerusalem Talmud describes the role, mediators
"fill the intermediate space between earth and the infinitely distant
realm of the Divine presence." If they get the illusion they are gods
themselves and not just messengers, they may end up as Count Bernadotte
did, an historical failure as a mediator who did more to harm the cause
of refugees and peace that he was so dedicated to helping. Mediators
must be grounded in the dirt and sand of the Middle East while attached
to a sense of justice that recognizes in advance that divine justice is
never applicable on earth. The best that can be accomplished under the
circumstances is the least injustice.
The role of the mediator is particularly crucial in the Middle
East. My own model has always been Ralph Bunche. An individual of
intelligence and integrity, he worked successfully in an arena in which
public eloquence was often seen as more important than negotiations, in
an area where Hermes, the Greek god of ruse and pretence, is often
regarded as the appropriate role for the messenger. Quiet diplomacy is
important in two senses. It must be quiet because it eschews public
noise and personal aggrandizement for silent successes. It must be
diplomatic because it recognizes the need for reticence, privacy and
discretion. But if we still believe that we can avoid the intrusion of
the media into every phase of the process, we will be mistaken. In
addition to the parties at the table, in addition to Canada as head
gaveller, in addition to the United States ensuring the table stays
together, the media will inevitably be a partner in the process. Not
only will Wilson's proclamation, "Open covenants openly arrived at" be
the ruling norm, but because of that norm, there will be an
unacknowledged partner in the negotiating process. Thus, we must, as
Janice Stein warned, integrate a communications strategy as part of the
whole process. Public opinion forged by the press will be integral to
any results achieved.
7B. A Communications Strategy
If Canada does not have a long term strategy, the small window of
opportunity to do something for the Palestinians will have been made
even smaller. Secondly, if we don't take a more significant control of
the operation, particularly the media aspects, I think we risk a
disaster. To put it another way, if we concentrate on just getting
everyone to the first meeting and staying at that meeting, and simply
count that as a success, we help build in the foundation for failure.
I want to suggest some communication policies the Canadian government
should consider adopting. 
Let me put it in the form of ten commandments for a media strategy
we or you should adopt. I agreed with the point Janice Stein made at
the meeting that you have to prepare the media. But I now go further.
You have to be prepared for the media.
The Ten Media Commandments
1. Always tell the truth. This does not only mean that we try to
ensure that the correct facts are disseminated, but that we give a
context for those facts and a comprehensive picture of the issue.
2. Have one spokesperson who is playing a senior role in the
negotiations. I suspect it should be Michael Bell from what you said
his role was. Whomever is chosen should be a senior player in the
managing the negotiations and capable of responding in a timely and
flexible way to events as they unfold.
3. Canada must play a leading role without appearing to control the
agenda or the contents. This will not be achieved if Canada says or
conveys that its role is simply to get the players to the table we look
like passive reactors only and, even worse, in the direct pocket of the
United States. On the other hand, if we appear *o take control, then we
defeat the idea of the negotiators taking ownership of the
negotiations. The model could be Henry Kissinger's role when he was
engaging in shuttle diplomacy to facilitate the Egyptian/Israeli and
Syrian/Israeli agreements. He gained leadership not by dictating the
terms or trying to control the negotiating parties, but by staying at
the centre of information and dissemination while having an overall
strategy in mind. Which brings us to the fourth commandment.
4. An overall strategy is critical to the success of a media campaign
as well as the slim chance of getting a positive outcome out of the
negotiations. If we don't have an idea in even the broadest outline of
8     1 The depiction of the phases is taken from Jim Lederman's book,
Battle Lines: The American Media and the Intifada, p. 168.
where we are going, we are never going to help anyone get there. We
have to imagine ourselves as tourist guides.
5. It is imperative that the spokesperson meet with media personnel
very frequently and informally.
The next five commandments operationalize the above.1
6. Shape the interpretation of the events that emerge. The initial
meeting will be events driven where the holding of the talks itself
will be the centre of attention - who comes, identifying what the
issues are and the tone of the emerging discussions. It is in this
first stage that we have to have the strategy down otherwise the events
will drive the Canadian diplomats as well as the negotiators instead of
the negotiators using the "happening" to gain control and direct the
agenda. At this stage virtually everyone, including media
representatives, are spectators waiting to be told where everything is
going. Let me give an example. If we are passive, the story will become
who attends and who does not attend, and that is the precise story most
likely to damage the talks. I think the story has to focus on refugees
and not on participants at the talk. Media images, video clips,
information packages, etc., all will help, but the key determinant will
be events, and most of the ones that emerge will be unpredictable. But
if one doesn't have some direction and a strategy, what emerges will
take over any efforts to exercise some direction and control and we
will be playing poker with 10 of the 13 cards wild.
7. Determine the key topic. If we can respond to and interpret the
events that emerge in a creative way, then the media people will look
to us for the context and background, so that the negotiations become
topic driven and we have the chance to establish a degree of control
over the negotiations. The key part of the strategy is establishing the
essential topic of discussion and what narrative line will be
developed.
8. Control the involvement of the general public. Decide whether we
need or do not need continuing public interest, and if we do need it,
then it will be necessary to get not only the negotiators to buy into
the process, but the general public as well. If we get the topic
established, interest may soon wane. Depending on what the overall
strategy may be, we could encourage such interest to fade or we may
want it to be sustained and increased. (I will suggest the latter and
9explain why I think the audience has to develop a vested interest in
the outcome so that they do not remain merely bystanders, but become
emotionally and intellectually engaged.) This means, of course,
exploring the motives and interests not only of the major players, but
of the bystanders as well so that they see how they are affected by and
affect the outcome.
9. Convert the general narrative line and topic to one clearly
defined central issue. In other words, we may start a process with
creative ambiguity as a tactic, but creative ambiguity will end up in
a shit-hole where we will stink ourselves and be blinded by the
swirling mess of controversy around. This entails focusing on clearly
defined options and the pros and cons of each.
10. Set forth an agenda and a process for resolving the key issue. The
public must remain involved (if my suggestions are followed about the
role of the public.)
C. The Role of Academics
Little needs to be said. Canada has already begun to use academics
as advisors, as long range thinkers and as a resource for the
preparation of think pieces and briefing books. Yet, as an academic, I
want to place a warning about the use of scholars. To quote the
medieval historian Ibn Khaldun, "Scholars of all people are those least
familiar with the ways of politics." We can provide distance and
detachment. We can even be messengers for the messengers in the way I
was used when I was sent from the meetings in Princeton, preparing the
groundwork for the opening of peace talks by academic advisors to the
U.S., Israeli, Jordanian, Egyptian, and Soviet governments, to speak to
Sari Nusseibah to entreat him and the Palestinians to resume their
participation in the discussions (Sari had walked out of the meeting,
for technical rather than substantive reasons.) What we cannot be are
the mediators and negotiators. If an academic becomes a mediator, as
Henry Kissinger did, he leaves the refuge of detachment for the hurly-
burly and fast track of politics requiring quick decisions. Kissinger
recognized the need to have both roles filled. Academics, if they are
to be useful, must not get so close and intimately involved in the
discussions that they lose their sense of distance and their freedom to
provide critical commentary on what is being said and done. Further,
when that commentary stops being critical, one can suspect that the
academics will have ceased to play their allotted role.
D. The Parties in the Region
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The most important factors to take into account are the character,
positions, policies, strategies and tactics of the parties to the
conflict, particularly the key parties. The latter consist of two -
Israel and the Palestinians.
1. The Palestinians
The issue of the Kurds may be brought up to score points. The
issue of the Jews who fled Arab lands may be critical when the
compensation issue is discussed and trade-offs are necessary. But the
only critical and central group of displaced persons and refugees that
the talks must deal with are the Palestinians.
The Palestinians, though part of the Jordanian delegation, are a
distinct national group. The primacy of that identity may have begun in
the 1920s but it only came to the fore after the Israeli capture of the
West Bank and Gaza in the 1967 war. Even then, Palestinians continued
the strategy of relying on others for the achievement of their
political goals. Increasingly, the Palestinians came more and more to
rely on their own efforts. But the initiative heretofore resided with
diaspora Palestinians. When the Palestinians were expelled from Lebanon
following the Israeli invasion of that country, the indigenous
population fell into a melancholic torpor. With the Egyptian peace
treaty, the defeat of Palestinian armed units on the last available
frontier with Israel (they were expelled from Jordan following Black
September in 1970), the vision of a messenger of salvation arriving
from without was gradually lost. The "shaking off" or uprising that
began spontaneously in 1987 under a young leadership rebelling as much
at the passivity of their elders as against the Israelis shifted the
centre of gravity of the Palestinian movement to the occupied
territories from the diaspora. This shift was virtually inevitable
given that the right had become the established government with its
announced policy of holding onto the territories, its large settlement
schemes in the population heartland of the West Bank, the large number
of Russian immigrant arrivals and finally and belatedly the
acknowledgement by the Palestinian leadership that it would accept half
a loaf (whether as an interim tactic or a strategic retreat) rather
than insisting on the whole loaf or nothing. 
This shift was evident in the commentary following the short-lived
rumours of Arafat's death in a plane crash in Libya. For example, the
Middle East journalist, Kattab, noted that one of the effects of
Arafat's death would be to reinforce the shift of the power centre of
Palestinian politics to the occupied territories. 
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What is the significance of this shift for Palestinian refugees
and displaced persons? It means two things. For the first time we can
openly state and acknowledge (even if it still has to be done subtly
and diplomatically - the wounds are still too fresh) that the
Palestinians in the diaspora are unlikely to be going back to their
homes in Lod, in Jaffa, in Haifa. If they want to go back, it will not
be to their homes; it will be at best their homeland. It must be
recalled that Count Bernadotte, on August 6 1948 had proposed an
unprecedented "right of return" for the Palestinian refugees, a
proposal which had much more to do with his own ideological convictions
that people had a "natural" soil to which they belonged and from which
they could not be alienated without destroying the soul of that people.
When he was assassinated by Israeli terrorists, this proposal, which
was initially greeted with widespread scepticism, was, three days after
his martyrdom, voted by the United Nations as a basic principle for
dealing with the Palestinian refugees, with the words "or compensation"
added to provide an escape. Repatriation to what is now Israel can be
finally faced as a forlorn and misplaced hope. The corollary question
can also be addressed - do the Palestinians in the diaspora want to go
to the West Bank (Gaza is clearly too crowded) and, if so, under what
political and economic conditions, or would they just as soon settle
elsewhere? 
The second point is that the Palestinians who were displaced in
1947-48 and who now live in Gaza and the West Bank with their
descendants will also not be going back. They will most likely be
staying where they are unless they choose and are able to emigrate. The
effect of both these points is that, for the first time, the resolution
of the plight of the displaced is conceptually, though not practically,
easier. The general outline of the answers is obvious. 
Further, no only is the conceptual opportunity available for the
first time. The existential plight of the Palestinians makes the
situation desperate. They are being squeezed from all directions. About
400,000 have been expelled from Kuwait. They are in the process of
being displaced from Saudi Arabia as potential fifth columnists. The
traditional outlets are being closed off. Desperation can give rise to
horrific explosions. It can also provide an opportunity to address the
issue.
It means, basically, that there will be two distinct, though
overlapping solutions to the Palestinian refugee problem. It also means
that all kinds of small, and some large, interim steps can be envisaged
which will both contribute to the peace process and greatly improve the
plight of the refugees and the displaced. For example, the major
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health, education and welfare ministry of the Palestinian peoples
(UNRWA) can be transferred to the control of the indigenous Palestinian
inhabitants, and this could be done even within the framework of an
interim administrative arrangement with direct assistance being
provided to the Palestinians themselves. There is no longer any vested
interest, political or otherwise, for any of the parties keeping the
Palestinians in refugee camps pending a final peace solution for the
prospect of return to their homes (except perhaps for a small number
under family reunification following a peace treaty) will finally have
been buried. It also means that concrete steps can be taken to
ascertain both the wishes of the Palestinian diaspora population, given
alternative political and economic scenarios, and when the steps do not
entail either a return to the West Bank during the interim period or a
surrender of the right to such return, then permanent settlement can be
provided for Palestinians in the diaspora.
In other words, the opportunity is ripe for dramatic improvements
in the conditions, protection and provided for the Palestinian people
as well as opportunities to govern themselves in key areas of health,
education and welfare.
There is, however, one very serious problem. The national identity
of the Palestinian people is now symbolically represented by the PLO
even though the shift in the centre of gravity of the politics of the
Palestinian community is now in the occupied territories at the same
time as religious fundamentalism within the territories challenges the
hegemony of that identity. The Israelis will resist any symbolic
nationalist expression of a self administered health, education,
welfare, and, I would add, housing ministry, and it will be important
for the Palestinians to insist on it and to do so in a way which is
continuous with the diaspora symbols of their nationalist struggle. The
religious fundamentalists will also resist, but for very different
reasons, and will fight for control of those areas of responsibility.
My own suspicion is that they will win such control in Gaza but not in
the West Bank. The result may be a three part solution, one for Gaza,
one for the West Bank and one for the diaspora. This may be appropriate
since the situation of the Gazans, without citizenship for any of the
indigenous population as well as for the refugees, and with its crowded
and impoverished situation, is so dramatically different than that for
the West Bankers.
At present, there is an incongruity between the extant, known and
recognized structures and organizations and the likely reality that
solutions will follow different courses for both the diaspora and the
indigenous population, and for two segments of the indigenous
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population - Gazans and West Bankers.
Refugees and Politics - a discussion of the 1948-68 when primacy
was placed on the refugee issue for the resolution of the Palestinian
problem. Next twenty years, primacy shifted to the political issue
under the leadership of the PLO. Now, must recognize it is both - i.e.
it remains a political issue for those in the occupied territories and
is primarily a refugee issue for those in the diaspora.
2. Israel
3. Jordan
4. Syria
5. Egypt
6. Iraq
7. Libya
8. Tunisia
IV International Agencies
1. The UN
2. UNRWA
3. UNHCR
X. Strategy
Now let me discuss the central issue of overall strategy. The
central issue of the other peace talks is now trading land for peace.
It could shift, if the Israelis are smart, but I doubt it. It could,
for example, become sharing land in peace. In either case, it won't
matter to our agenda. For the refugee issue can only handicap the other
peace talks if they are joined - such as if the issue becomes focused
on return of the Palestinians. It will exacerbate fears of the Israelis
of large numbers (the same reaction as the Palestinians had to the
arrival of the Russians) and provide ammunition for more radical
Palestinian representatives. On the other side, it will shift
leadership from the inhabitants of Gaza and the West Bank back to
Tripoli, thereby undercutting the authority and role of the indigenous
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population who have the greatest interest in making a deal. The issue
of refugees must be established as one separate from the peace issue
but where its outcome will be critical to the peace talks. That is, we
must establish that the peace talks are not simply a fifth stream, but
a stream belonging to a very different category where progress can be
made independently of the progress of the peace talks themselves in a
way that reinforces the security and confidence of both sides. This
means when we lead up to the first meeting, we have to have a story and
a context that shows how the joining of the refugee and peace issues as
necessarily dependent on one another has, in fact, inhibited progress
on either, at least as far as the Palestinian refugees are concerned.
If the talks are not to be event driven, they must not get bogged
down over the participants or the agenda items. I thought Stephen
Cohen's inclusion principle was a superb solution to avoiding fights
over the agenda. However, we did not adequately discuss the
participation issue. 
My first reaction was that the diaspora Palestinians had to be
included because this was a refugee issue no matter what the Israelis
say. However, on further reflection, I think this is wrong. My reason
is not because we want and need the refugees at the table. It is
because the indigenous Palestinians and the Israelis both have a common
interest in not having diaspora Palestinians return. This is not only
for power reasons, reasons of security and leadership, or economics,
but diaspora political Palestinians are the absolutely wrong people to
deal with the issue as a refugee issue. They will want to use the
refugee talks as their entrée to take over the major agenda.
On the other hand, if Palestinian diaspora personnel are not in
attendance, then how can the key issue with respect to refugees - the
Palestinian refugee issue be discussed? And if they are, the Israelis
will not attend. I suggest the following format as an attempt to
resolve the issue: the creation of two subcommittees. At the major
supervisory committee, the agreed formula for participation would be
used. Palestinian representatives concerned primarily with Palestinian
refugees in Gaza and the West Bank would attend one subcommittee.
Palestinian representatives concerned with and expert on Palestinian
refugees in the Diaspora would attend the other subcommittee; it would
not be crucial for Israel to attend the latter.
Secondly, I was also initially predisposed to including UNRWA and
UNHCR. I now think UNRWA should not be included. It is not that they
are another voice for the Palestinians, but they are not a voice based
on representative principles; they are a neo-colonial voice. And they
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are driven by a myth that they are most responsible for perpetuating
over the years - that the refugee issue cannot and will not be solved
until the conflict issues are solved. The fact is they have it ass
backwards. The resolution of the refugee issue is a necessary, but not
sufficient condition for resolving the peace issue.
Summary: Don't let the agenda be hijacked by the participation issue;
stick to the original framework on the overall committee, not because
it was the original framework, though that is one argument on its
behalf, but because it is the one and only framework likely to produce
good results. That is, support the framework for participation and
exclude both UNRWA and the diaspora from the overall committee, but
include the Palestinian diaspora representatives in a subcommittee.
Include technical experts from both in the technical side talks. 
Though this initially appears to serve the Israeli agenda, it, in
fact, undercuts it because, as you will see, it reinforces the idea
that the Palestinians need a state of their own to which they can
belong while, at the same time, not denying a law of return for
Palestinians in the diaspora.
If we get past the first talks were the events do not drive the
Canadian diplomats, but Canadian diplomats gain the direction and
control of the responses to events, then we will be in a position to
establish what the key topic should be - that the refugee talks are
separate and distinct from the other talks and yet a necessary but
insufficient precondition for making progress in those other talks.
Summary:
Establish the talks as separate and distinct.
Establish the primary context and narrative line that the failure to
resolve the refugee issue separately has undermined the prospects of
peace in the past.
The next problem is - What should the central issue become? It is
and will remain the plight of the Palestinian refugees and not the
Kurds and certainly not the return of Jewish refugees from Arab lands.
But it must not become the humanitarian situation of the refugees as
Stephen Cohen had suggested. It must be the lack of membership in a
state that provides their protection. That needs to be said more
simply. But saying it this way reinforces the need for and recognition
of some Palestinian state - it could even be Jordan, that is for the
other talks to work out. But, at the same time, establishing a
Palestinian state won't solve the plight of the refugees in the
diaspora. Further, the failure to solve their problem exaggerates
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irredentism and creates a constituency for undermining a settlement
dictated by the indigenous population.
Summary:
The talks should end up focusing on the Palestinian refugees.
The lack of citizenship for these refugees should be the key issue.
If we are clear about how to control the events, if we are clear
about what the central initial topic will have to be, if we establish
that the central issue is the lack of citizenship in a state for the
Palestinians, then the next issue will be whether we need the public to
be continuously involved. I think we do. Here is why. It is my belief
that an independent Palestinian state for the indigenous residents of
Gaza and the West Bank - however it is configured and whatever, if any,
state it is linked to, cannot absorb 600,000 to 1,000,000 Palestinians
at the time of a peace settlement. Does that mean they continue to rot
in camps. We will only be witnesses to an upsurge in terrorism that
will make the seventies look tame and the intifada look like a picnic.
The diaspora Palestinians cannot be left out of the deal. On the other
hand, they cannot return immediately to a new Palestine. There is one
and only one option, as I see it. They have to be given citizenship in
the West, without in any way taking away their right to return, if and
when they want, to a Palestinian state.
That means Canada, for example, will have to admit up to a roughly
estimated 60,000 Palestinians over a 1-2 year period. Would we be
willing to do it? Will we want to do it? Can we do it? To answer the
last question is, first, yes we can do it, but only if the Canadian
public is motivated to make it their issue and not just a Middle East
issue. Only if the Europeans and American people make it their issue
and not just a ME issue. My own conviction is that this is the central
issue - not the players at the table, but the western media public.
Without their buying into the solution, my own belief at this moment is
that the talks will be a waste of time. And unless we think about this
now, we will get everything wrong.
Summary:
Resettlement in the West for many Palestinians is critical.
The public must see that they have an interest in the outcome so their
motives and interests must be included and become part of the
developing story.
If we get that far, then the resolution will be easy. But we have
to plan for developing a strategy that will involve all  of the West,
particularly the Europeans, and we must begin planning that strategy
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now.
